# passbolt

#### \$ whoami



remy@pasbolt.com




Connect with me on LinkedIn



#### \$ hostname





@passbolt@mastodon.social

## passbolt

Open-source password manager for teams







CYBERSECURITY MADE IN EUROPE

## Authentication?

Asserting a user identity using something they:

know (passphrase, password, pin) have (token, certificate, key) are (biometric) or do (typing pattern, gait)

#### Password based authentication

#### Security issues:

- Credential stuffing.
- Phishing.
- Password loss.
- Bruteforce (online)
- Bruteforce (offline, in case of leak).
- Adversary in the middle (network)
- Password logging.
- User enumeration

Implementation considerations:

- Checking against breaches & entropy
- User training
- Account recovery
- Captcha (+GDPR) / WAF / Alerts
- "Costly" hashing mechanism (bcrypt)
- HTTPs pinned and well configured
- Additional client side hashing?
- Vague error messages & constant time?

## "Magic link" authentication

Security issues:

- Phishing (email provider)
- User enumeration
- Man in the middle
- Replay attack
- Email logging / intercept

UX issues:

- Context switch, email delays, etc.

Implementation considerations:

- User training
- + Vague error messages & constant time?
- HTTPs required, no HTTP fallback
- One-off use, expiry date
- ► TLS for SMTP, relays, etc.

- Email client "preview" counts as a click?

## SMS authentication

#### Security issues:

- Phishing
- Adversary in the middle
- Bruteforce
- SIM Card swap
- Phone theft (notif on lock screen?)
- SMS interception
- Delays in receiving SMS

Implementation considerations:

- User training
- HTTPs required
- Max failed attempts / throttling / Alerts
- Choose a good carrier?
- Set safe phone settings?

### MFA/TOTP authentication

Security issues:

- Adversary in the middle (phishing site)
- Adversary in the middle (network)
- Bruteforce
- Sync' without encryption

#### UX issues:

- Lost TOTP

Implementation considerations:


- User training
- + HTTPs required, no HTTP fallback
- Max failed attempts / throttling / Alerts
- TOTP app preference?

+ Admin reset process? Another MFA?

## FIDO2? Passkeys? Webauthn? U2F? CTAP?

#### FIDO2 Project

#### A joint effort between the FIDO Alliance and the W3C




#### Passkeys

A private-public keypair (credential) that can be used to authenticate and that can be synced across multiple devices (as opposed to hardware bound).



## WebAuthn authentication


Assertion, e.g. authentication flow (login flow)



## How does it look?




### Registration on MacOS/Chrome







## Registration on MacOS/Chrome





Allow this site to see your security key? demo.yubico.com wants to see the make and model of your security key

Allow




Cancel

#### Managing passkeys on MacOS/Chrome

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		Sign in automatically Geogle Bassword Manager remembers how you signed in and automatically signs you in when possible. When off, you'll be asked for confirmation every time.	● ● © Coogle Password Manager × ‡ Set ← → C © Chrome   chrome://settings/passkey		× ف 🖈 🖬 🕹 :
		Use your screen lock when filling in passwords If you share this device with others, you can use your screen lock to verify that it's you whenever	Settings	Q. Search settings	
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		to import passwords to ucogie rassword Manager on this device, select a USV file.	Privacy and security		
		To get here quicker, add a shortcut to Google Password Manager Manage passkeys	C Performance     Appearance	Site Username	
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
#### Registration on MacOS/Chrome/iOS




#### Managing Pass<del>words</del>keys on iOS

Q	Passkey S Cancel	Q Passwords	Cancel	Set		Passwords		Passwords		🗂 Edit
	Password & Security	Passwords and Keychain Apple ID → iCloud		Qy	rub		× Cancel		o.com	
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[J]	Face ID & Passcode									
	Allow Access When Locked									
	Change Passcode									
	Erase Data Passcode									
	Home Control Passcode							WEBSITE		
	Reply with Message							demo.yubico.co	om	
	Require Passcode								Delete Passkey	
q	wertyuiop	q w e r t y	u i o p							
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
#### Registration on MacOS/Safari



#### Registration on MacOS/Safari



"Currently, YubiKeys can store a maximum of 25 passkeys." (if you've never entered a PIN when you registered your Yubikey you are not using resident keys).



#### Managing Pass<del>words</del>keys on MacOS

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Default Keychains	All Items Passwords	Secure Notes	My Certificates Key	s Certificates	
iCloud					
System Keychains					
🔒 System					
💼 System Roots	Name		Kind	Date Modified	~ Expires

•••	Passwords	
Q Search	Password Options	
LOCK Screen		
Touch ID & Password	Security Recommendations Security risks found	
😕 Users & Groups		
Passwords	Q yub	⊗ + … →
Internet Accounts	Yubico.com Yubico demo user	í
🥦 Game Center		
📰 Wallet & Apple Pay	Yubico.com Yubico demo user	(j)
🦲 Keyboard	yubico.com Yubico demo user	j
🚺 Mouse		
💽 Trackpad		?
Printers & Scanners		
🔒 GPG Suite		



Will be saved in iCloud Keychain?



Will be stored in settings > passwords!

#### Recovery of passkeys (iCloud)

"Passkeys can be recovered through <u>iCloud keychain escrow</u>, which is also protected against brute-force attacks, even by Apple. [...]

To recover a keychain, a user must authenticate with their iCloud account and password and respond to an SMS sent to their registered phone number. After they authenticate and respond, the user must enter their device passcode. iOS, iPadOS, and macOS allow only 10 attempts to authenticate. After several failed attempts, the record is locked and the user must call Apple Support to be granted more attempts. After the tenth failed attempt, the escrow record is destroyed.

Optionally, a user can set up an account recovery contact [...]."

Ref. https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec3e341e75d/web

#### Passwords security issues

Security issues:

- -Credential stuffing.
- Adversary in the middle (phishing).
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#### Implementation considerations:

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- User training
- Account recovery
- <del>Captcha (+CDPR) / WAF / Alerts</del>
- "Costly" hashing mechanism (berypt)
- HTTPs pinned and well configured
- + Additional client side hashing?
- See small prints

#### Passkeys security issues

Security issues:

- Passkeys loss (device loss)
- Physical Proximity (BLE, NFC)
- Passkey management & review
- Passkeys availability to admins?
- User enumeration
- Root CA leak / rotation
- Quantum computers?
- more, see Security considerations

#### Implementation considerations:

- Account recovery? More passkeys?
- Accept risk?
- User training? Better UX? Alerts?
- Better signalization of sharing props
- Username-less design
- Passkey rotations
- PQC, crypto agility

#### Passkeys issues

Other issues:

- End user experience
- Specs stabilization?
- Authenticator gatekeeping?
- Pay to play / Diversity?
- Open-source ecosystem support

#### Other considerations:

- UX Working group
- Traction?
- Monkey patching? Fines?
- Get involved?
- Get involved!

## Thank you! Any questions?